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Abstract
Background: The human leukocyte antigen (HLA) system is widely used as a strategy in the search
for the etiology of infectious diseases and autoimmune disorders. During the Taiwan epidemic of
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), many health care workers were infected. In an effort
to establish a screening program for high risk personal, the distribution of HLA class I and II alleles
in case and control groups was examined for the presence of an association to a genetic susceptibly
or resistance to SARS coronavirus infection.
Methods: HLA-class I and II allele typing by PCR-SSOP was performed on 37 cases of probable
SARS, 28 fever patients excluded later as probable SARS, and 101 non-infected health care workers
who were exposed or possibly exposed to SARS coronavirus. An additional control set of 190
normal healthy unrelated Taiwanese was also used in the analysis.
Results: Woolf and Haldane Odds ratio (OR) and corrected P-value (Pc) obtained from two tails
Fisher exact test were used to show susceptibility of HLA class I or class II alleles with coronavirus
infection. At first, when analyzing infected SARS patients and high risk health care workers groups,
HLA-B*4601 (OR = 2.08, P = 0.04, Pc = n.s.) and HLA-B*5401 (OR = 5.44, P = 0.02, Pc = n.s.)
appeared as the most probable elements that may be favoring SARS coronavirus infection. After
selecting only a "severe cases" patient group from the infected "probable SARS" patient group and
comparing them with the high risk health care workers group, the severity of SARS was shown to
be significantly associated with HLA-B*4601 (P = 0.0008 or Pc = 0.0279).
Conclusions: Densely populated regions with genetically related southern Asian populations
appear to be more affected by the spreading of SARS infection. Up until recently, no probable SARS
patients were reported among Taiwan indigenous peoples who are genetically distinct from the
Taiwanese general population, have no HLA-B* 4601 and have high frequency of HLA-B* 1301.
While increase of HLA-B* 4601 allele frequency was observed in the "Probable SARS infected"
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patient group, a further significant increase of the allele was seen in the "Severe cases" patient
group. These results appeared to indicate association of HLA-B* 4601 with the severity of SARS
infection in Asian populations. Independent studies are needed to test these results.
Background
In late April 2003, Taiwan was stroked by an epidemic of
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). A general SARS
panic spread over the country when the Taipei Municipal
Hoping hospital announced its shutdown as a preventive
measure following heavy hospital infection. Further close-
down of medical services, including emergency services,
appeared sporadically in other hospitals and clinics all
over the country. This caused great anxiety among all
health care workers. On May 4, 2003, a suspected SARS
patient with respiratory failure was brought to the Emer-
gency Service of the Mackay Memorial Hospital in Taipei.
The patient was admitted into SARS wards and died 24
hours later. However, during this short period the patient
most likely infected 4 health care workers and 5 individu-
als who were either patients or visiting family members of
other patients present at the same time. The hospital set
up emergency procedures, and most manpower was put
into caring of SARS patients. Taiwan hospitals were facing
an unpredictable and invisible enemy for the first time in
recent 50 years. The human leukocyte antigen (HLA) sys-
tem is widely used as a strategy in the search for the etiol-
ogy of infectious diseases and autoimmune disorders. In
this study we investigated the HLA-class I and II system for
evidence of disease association. It was hoped that the dis-
covery of disease susceptibility or a disease protection
phenotype in the Taiwan population would help into set-
ting up a preventive screening program for health care
workers at risk.
Methods
Patients
In the course of March 19 to May 22, 2003, 93 cases of
suspected SARS were reported by Mackay Memorial Hos-
pital in Taipei City and its branch in Tan Sui County of
Taipei to the Center for Disease Control in Taiwan. Up
until early June, among 680 probable SARS cases reported
in Taiwan, 71 (10.4%) cases were admitted to our hospi-
tal. Between May 5 and 26, 2003, 63 EDTA blood samples
from fever patients with respiratory illness were collected
in our hospitals. Two earlier specimens from the National
Taiwan University Hospital (Taipei) were added to this
study. Of the 65 (63+2) cases, 37 cases (table 1) were diag-
nosed as probable SARS cases according to updated WHO
case definition for SARS (revised May 1, 2003) [1]. Three
families were included (cases 31 and 32; cases 33 and 34;
and cases 35, 36 and 37). Only the first infected patient in
each family (cases 31, 33, 35) was retained for the analysis
giving a final count of 33 probable SARS patients. Nine
unrelated individuals (cases 7, 13, 18, 19, 21, 22, 26, 27,
and 31) were infected from the same source (unfortu-
nately this "super-spreader" probable SARS patient died
24 hours after admission in hospital and was not studied).
Twenty eight cases of the 65 cases were not positive for
SARS, and were referred as "Excluded fever patients" in
tables 2 and 4. Among the "Excluded fever patients"
group, two patients showed positive serological tests for
M. pneumonias, one had tuberculosis, one patient pre-
sented lung edema, and the rest had no lung lesions.
Clinical symptoms, of the 37 patients diagnosed as prob-
able SARS cases, were as follows: 92% (34 cases) showed
diffuse infiltration of both lungs and 8% (3 cases) showed
only solitary lung lesion; 65% (24 cases) showed at least
one positive test result for SARS-CoV RNA by RT-PCR [2]
or by real time PCR (Artus, Germany). In addition, the fol-
lowing laboratory data was obtained from the 35 proba-
ble SARS patients managed in our hospital: 27% (10
cases) with reduced platelet count (<150×10-9/liter), 59%
(22 cases) with lymphocytopenia (<1×10-9/liter), 70%
(26 cases) with elevated LDH, 5% (2 cases) with elevated
creatine kinase, 54% (20 cases) with elevated AST and /or
ALT and 68% (25 cases) with elevated C-reactive protein.
Fourteen cases were also tested for HBsAg, all showed neg-
ative results.
Serum samples from 27 probable SARS cases were tested
for Chlamydia pneumoniae, C. psittaci and C. trachomatis
(Chlamydia IgM kit, Savyon Diagnostic, Israel), and 11
were further tested for IgG and IgA antibodies. All showed
negative results. Among 24 probable SARS cases who had
been tested for M. pneumoniae (IgM, Savyon Diagnostic,
Israel), only two cases tested positive. These two cases also
had diffuse bilateral lung lesions and positive SARS-CoV
RNA test. It is possible that 8% of probable SARS cases
were co-infected with M. pneumoniae. Finally, 15 cases
were also tested for Legionella pneumophilia serogroup 1
antigen (Binax, US), and showed negative results.
All 37 probable cases revealed history of close or indirect
contact with another suspected probable case of SARS.
Three patients with severe respiratory failure airways had
been intubated and mechanical ventilation was applied
during hospitalization. Later, two patients died and one
survived. Finally, among the 35 probable SARS cases of
our hospital four patients died during hospitalization,
giving an 11% mortality rate. Except for two rapid severe/
fatal cases most probable SARS patients were admitted toBMC Medical Genetics 2003, 4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2350/4/9
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the SARS wards for periods longer than two weeks. A final
diagnosis of "probable SARS" was declared upon exclu-
sion of all other possible causes.
In brief, 33 cases of "probable SARS patients" and 28
"Excluded fever patients" were retained for the analysis.
This study was performed with approval of the ethics
committee of the Mackay Memorial Hospital in Taipei.
Controls
Control A
Blood samples were obtained at the end of May 2003
from 62 health care workers who had possibly been
exposed to coronavirus and were not infected. These 62
health care workers were either working at emergency
services, SARS wards (doctors and nurses) or at the out
patient clinic (phlebotomists) of our hospital in May
2003. These 62 health care workers were included in con-
trol A (table 2) and had followed World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO) vigorous measures against infection. Another
39 blood samples from non-infected health care workers
from the Taipei Municipal Hoping Hospital were added to
control A. These 39 controls had been treating SARS
patients in April 2003 without adequate protection from
infection, and about 10% of health care workers from the
same wards developed probable SARS. In brief, 101 high
Table 1: HLA-A, B, DRB1 allele typing of 37 probable SARS patients
Case no HLA-A HLA-B HLA-DRB1
1* 2402 3303 4601 5801 0301 0901
2* 0201/07 2402 1525 4601 0901 1202
3* 0201/07 2402 1513 4601 0403/06 1202
4* 1101/02 1101/02 4001 4601 0901 1401/07
5 1101/02 3303 4601 5801 0403/06 0901
6 0201/07 1101/02 4601 5502 0901 0901
7† 1101/02 1101/02 4601 5401 1101/04 1501/02
8 0201/07 2402 4601 1501/12/19 0901 1501/02
9 0201/07 3303 4601 5801 0803 1301/02
10 0203 2402 4601 5201 1001 1602
11 0201/07 3303 4601 4601 0901 1101/04
12 0201/07 1101/02 5201 5401 0405/10 1001
13† 0201/07 2402 5401 5801 0301 0405/10
14 1101/02 2402 1502 5401 0405/10 1401/07
15 0201/07 1101/02 4001 1502 1202 1501/02
16 1101/02 2402 5502 4001 0405/10 0901
17 0203 2402 2704 4001 0403/06 1602
18† 3303 3303 4001 5801 0301 0901
19† 0201/07 1101/02 1511 4001 0901 1602
20 2402 2402 4001 5801 0301 1201
21† 1101/02 1101/02 3901 4001 0403/06 1401/07
22* † 1101/02 2402 4001 8101 0901 1312
23 1101/02 3303 4001 4001 0803 0901
24 2402 3303 3901 5801 0901 1501/02
25 1101/02 1101/02 3901 4803 0803 1405
26† 2402 3303 3901 5801 0301 0901
27† 0203 1101/02 3802 3901 1101/04 1602
28 1101/02 3303 5102 5801 0301 1202
29 1101/02 2402 1502 1502 1202 1202
30 0201/07 1101/02 1301 4001 1401/07 1501/02
31† 0201/07 0301 0702 4601 1101/04 1501/02
32 0301 2402 0702 5502 1401/07 1501/02
33* 0201/07 0201/07 4601 4601 0901 1405
34 0201/07 1101/02 4601 4001 0901 1501/02
35 0201/07 1101/02 5401 1502 0405/10 1401/07
36 0201/07 1101/02 5401 4001 0405/10 1401/07
37 1101/02 1101/02 4001 1502 1401/07 1405
Cases 31 and 32; cases 33 and 34 are mother- daughter pairs. Case 35 is the father of cases 36 and 37 * Fatal cases and one severe respiratory 
failure patient who survived after intubation (case 33). † Individuals most likely infected by the same probable SARS patient who died 24 hrs after 
admission.BMC Medical Genetics 2003, 4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2350/4/9
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risk non-infected health care workers were retained as
control A for the analysis. Informed consent was obtained
from all subjects.
Control B
HLA-A, B and DRB1 typing of 190 normal healthy, unre-
lated Taiwanese was obtained from data collected in our
laboratory and used as control B. For control B, HLA-A, B
class I typing was performed by serological methods only
[3]. HLA-DRB1 typing was performed by allele typing as
described below for the other groups.
HLA allele typing
Blood samples were collected in EDTA vacutainers. Buffy
coat were lysed and genomic DNA was isolated by using
proteinase K treatment and Q1Aamp blood kit (Q1Agen,
Hilden, Germany) according to the manufacturer's
instructions. Suspected SARS samples were processed in a
bio-safety level-3 environment. Medium resolution allele
typing for HLA-A, B and DRB1 loci was performed using
PCR amplification followed by sequence-specific oligonu-
cleotide probing (PCR-SSOP), (Dynal Biotech Ltd; Wirral,
U.K.). Amplified sequences were hybridized to arrays of
immobilized probes (35 probes for HLA-A, 56 for HLA-B,
and 38 for HLA-DRB1).
Statistical analysis
HLA class I and class II allele frequencies were estimated
by direct counting assuming that there was no blanks.
Odds ratios (OR) were obtained from standard contin-
gency table analysis using Haldane's modification of
Woolf's method [4,5]. Statistical significance was per-
formed by a two tails Fisher's exact test [6]. Since small
size samples were used in the analysis, the risk of intro-
ducing a bias in estimating the probability (P-value) and
wrongly accepting association (type I error) was corrected
using the method of Edwards (7). In this method the P-
value is multiplied by the number of independent com-
parisons at every locus, thereby giving a more powerful
corrected P-value (Pc-value) that may be interpreted with
confidence. Lastly, when analyzing serological data, data
in the patient group were converted to serology typing
using the World Health Organization nomenclature
(WHO) table of correspondence [8].
Results
In this study we performed allele typing on 37 probable
SARS cases, 28 fever patients of suspected SARS (these 28
patients were later excluded for being non SARS patients),
and 101 health care workers (control A) exposed or possi-
bly exposed to SARS coronavirus but non-infected health
Table 2: Allele odds ratios analysis between probable SARS patients and other groups
33 Cases
Probable
SARS
patients
28 fever
patients
Control A
101 high risk non-infected
health care workers
Control B†
190 healthy unrelated Taiwanese
HLA alleles Total number 
of alleles
n = 66
Total number 
of alleles
n = 56
P Total number 
of alleles
n = 202
OR† CI P Total number 
of alleles
n = 380
OR‡ CI P
B* 4601/B46 15 9 n.s. 25 2.08 1.04–4.24 0.04 52 1.86 1.02–3.54 0.06
B* 1301/B13 1 3 n.s. 18 0.16 0.02–1.00 0.03 34 0.16 0.02–0.97 0.02
B* 5401/B54 5 3 n.s. 3 5.44 1.26–23.41 0.02 15 1.99 1.01–5.69 n.s.
B* 3901/B39 5 2 n.s. 6 2.68 0.78–9.08 n.s. 8 3.81 1.21–12.03 0.03
P = P-value n.s. = not significant. † In control B, HLA-A and B were defined by serological methods. Consequently data were re-analyzed after 
converting allotypes of probable SARS patients to their serological equivalents [8]. ‡Odds ratio (OR) refers to Woolf-Haldane odds ratios, with 95% 
Woolf approximation confidence intervals (CI) and corresponding two tails Fisher P-values. Note: No corrected P-values (Pc-values) were significant; 
consequently Pc-values were not indicated.
Table 3: HLA-B* 4601 allele and 6 deceased or intubated probable SARS patients
Case no Gender Age HLA-B allele Associated clinical conditions Outcome
1 F 47 B* 4601, B* 5801 None Intubated, died
2 F 26 B* 1525, B* 4601 Pregnancy (3rd trimester) Intubated, died
3 M 53 B* 1513, B* 4601 None Died
4 F 43 B* 4001, B* 4601 None Died
22 M 91 B* 4001, B* 8101 Chronic renal insufficiency, peptic 
ulcer, coronary heart disease
Died
33 F 50 B* 4601, B* 4601 None Intubated, survivedBMC Medical Genetics 2003, 4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2350/4/9
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care workers from Mackay Memorial Hospital and Taipei
Municipal Hoping Hospital in Taiwan. HLA-A, B and
DRB1 allele typing using PCR-SSOP method was per-
formed on these cases. The HLA data of 190 healthy unre-
lated Taiwanese in our data bank was also used in this
study as control B. HLA alleles typing of 37 probable SARS
cases are shown in table 1.
Analysis between 33 retained unrelated probable SARS
cases, 28 excluded fever patients, and two control groups
(table 2) showed weak association to infection of HLA
class I alleles (B* 4601, OR = 2.08, P = 0.04, Pc = n.s. and
B* 5401, OR = 5.44, P = 0.02, Pc = n.s. with control A; and
B* 3901/B39, OR = 3.81, P = 0.03, Pc = n.s. with control
B). HLA-B* 4601 was not significant (n.s.) when testing
analogous serotypes of the 33 probable SARS patients
against the 190 healthy unrelated Taiwanese of control B
(OR = 1.86, P = 0.06, Pc = n.s.) (table 2). HLA-B* 1301 is
a common HLA allele in Taiwan, the number of HLA-B*
1301 alleles seen in control A and control B were 18
(8.9%) and 34 (8.9%), respectively (table 2). Unexpect-
edly, only one HLA-B* 1301 allele was found among the
33 probable SARS cases (case 30, table 1, 2). When testing
HLA-B* 1301 with the 33 probable SARS cases, both con-
trol A and control B showed elevated odds ratios (OR =
0.16, P = 0.03, Pc = n.s. and OR = 0.16, P = 0.02, Pc = n.s.,
respectively).
The 33 probable SARS patients also included 6 severe
cases among whom three were patients who had been
intubated for mechanical ventilation and five were
deceased (table 1). Except for case 22 (table 1 and 3), the
remaining five cases carried HLA-B* 4601. Case 22, how-
ever was a 91 years old man suffering from chronic renal
failure, peptic ulcer and coronary heart disease. The cause
of death of this patient was unlikely due to SARS alone
and the case was removed from this group. The remaining
5 cases, labeled "Deceased or intubated probable SARS
patients" in table 4, were retained for the analysis on the
severity of SARS. The association of HLA class I and the
severity of SARS was evidenced by an important increase
of the odds ratio of HLA-B* 4601 in the deceased or intu-
bated probable SARS patient group against all other
groups, notably with the 28 excluded fever patients (OR =
7.83, P = 0.007, Pc = n.s.) and with control A (OR = 10.62,
P = 0.0008, Pc = 0.0279) (table 4). HLA-B* 5401 and
HLA-B* 3901/B39 did not show association with the
severity of SARS infection (data not shown).
Discussion
HLA-B gene was found to be associated with susceptibility
or protection from infection when analyzing descendants
of Dutch colonists' survivors of 19th Century yellow fever
and typhoid epidemics [10]. Other studies also indicated
that HLA variations were associated with susceptibility or
resistance to malaria, tuberculosis, leprosy, HIV and
hepatitis virus persistence [11,12]. In ethnic Thai, HLA-A
and B alleles were confirmed to be associated with disease
severity and clinical outcome of exposure to dengue virus
in previously exposed immunologically primed individu-
als [13]. Moreover, direct evidence of human coronavirus
OC43 interaction with HLA class I molecules at the cell
surface to establish infection was also described [14].
Consequently we carried out a study to analyze the rela-
tion between HLA class I and class II alleles, in SARS coro-
navirus infection, and/or the severity of the disease. In this
study, no association between HLA class II allele and SARS
coronavirus infection was seen. Although HLA-B* 4601
frequency in the 33 probable SARS patients (table 2) was
only slightly higher than the frequencies seen in control A
or control B (P = 0.04, Pc = n.s. and P = 0.06, Pc = n.s.,
respectively). On the contrary, the frequency of HLA-B*
4601 in the five severe cases (table 4) was slightly
increased when compared to the 28 excluded fever
patients (P = 0.007, Pc = ns), but the difference was clearly
significant when compared to control A (P = 0.0008, Pc =
0.03). This increased HLA-B* 4601 difference was unique
to the five severe cases patients and may indicate associa-
tion with the severity of SARS. A susceptibly of HLA-B*
5401/B54 or B* 3901/B39 to infection rather than to the
severity of the disease (table 2) could not be concluded
upon (Pc = n.s.) and requires further studies. HLA-B13 is
widely distributed throughout Asia [18] where it is mostly
represented by HLA-B* 1301 (4–30%) and rarely by B*
1302 (0–2%) [Unpublished data]. Furthermore, HLA-B13
is seen with frequencies greater than 16% among most
Table 4: Effect of HLA-B* 4601 allele on severity of SARS patients
5 deceased or 
intubated probable 
SARS patients 
(Severe cases)
28 Excluded fever patients Control A
101 high risk non-infected health care workers
HLA allele Total number of 
alleles (n = 10)
Total number of 
alleles (n = 56)
OR CI P Pc-value 
(20)†
Total number of 
alleles (n = 202)
OR CI P Pc-value (33)†
B* 4601 6 9 7.83 1.83–33.47 0.007 n.s. 25 10.62 2.80–40.26 0.0008 0.0279
n= count of alleles; P = P-value; n.s. = not significant. † The correction factor (number of different alleles or number of comparisons) is shown within 
parenthesis; Pc-value = P × Correction factor (Edward, 1974).BMC Medical Genetics 2003, 4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2350/4/9
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indigenous tribes of the central mountain area in Taiwan
[9] and in the Taiwanese (9.1%). In this study, we found
that presence of HLA-B* 1301/B13 was decreased in the
33 probable SARS patients when compared with the two
control groups A (OR = 0.16, P = 0.03, Pc = n.s.) or B (OR
= 0.16, P = 0.02, Pc = n.s.). However, only the analysis of
a larger case-control data set would confirm or refute asso-
ciation of HLA-B* 1301 with resistance to coronavirus
infection.
Taiwan population is heterogeneous and comprises 91%
Taiwanese, 7.5% Chinese who arrived from many differ-
ent provinces of China after World War II, and 1.5% of
indigenous peoples established there since several millen-
niums. The Taiwanese comprised the Minnan and Hakka
people groups, and are the descendants of early settlers
from the southeast coast of China (Fujian and Guangdong
Provinces) during the last few centuries. The genetic pro-
file of the Taiwanese shows many affinities to southern
Asian populations [3] and share the same origin with Sin-
gapore Chinese and Thai Chinese who also originated
from the southeast coast of China. According to archeo-
logical evidences [15], the populations in the delta of the
Hong River in northern Vietnam are also likely related to
these populations. After the outbreak of SARS coronavirus
infection in the Guangdong Province of China, it was sur-
prising to observe that the spreading of the disease was
mostly confined among southern Asian populations
(Hong-Kong peoples, Vietnamese, Singaporeans and Tai-
wanese). Density of populations possibly favored the
growth of the epidemic. The question aroused as to
whether affected southern Asian populations were more
susceptible to SARS infection than peoples of northern
China (Beijing), Japan, or Korea. Many peoples in Beijing
generally considered as northern Chinese [16], were also
infected, however, infection in Beijing could be attributed
to heterogeneity of populations following important
recent migration of southern Chinese and population
resettlement during the Cultural Revolution.
The probable SARS cases in this report consist mainly of
southern Chinese origin Taiwanese (non indigenous peo-
ples). Contraction of SARS by Taiwan indigenous individ-
uals from any of the nine tribes of Taiwan has not yet been
reported to this day. It is possible that the HLA make up
of the Taiwan indigenous peoples has little in common to
the Taiwanese [9] and may not contain any element favor-
ing SARS infection. Also, HLA-B* 4601/B46 displays
higher frequencies in Southern Han (15.4%), in Singapo-
rean (15.1%) and in Vietnamese (13.2%) than in North-
ern Han (2.8%)[18], but the allele has rarely been seen
among indigenous peoples [9] except in children of inter-
marriage between Taiwanese and indigenous peoples [9].
Interestingly, HLA-B* 4601/B46 is also seldom seen in
Europeans populations where very few cases of SARS
infection of individuals of European origin were reported
[17].
The presence or absence of HLA-B* 4601 in a population
appeared to be an important element that acted during
the outbreak of the SARS epidemic. Certainly, further
independent studies are still needed to confirm this
hypothesis. However, Taiwan indigenous peoples have no
HLA-B* 4601 and have very low population density. This
does not exclude that they may have avoided infection
only by chance, even though many indigenous peoples
are now urbanized and would have run the same risk as
Taiwanese. Southern Asian peoples, not only live in
highly densely populated regions, but also have less vari-
ation in their HLA related immune repertoires than
European or African populations [Variation was inferred
here from the heterozygosity (h = 1 - sum of squares of
allele frequencies) seen in these populations, and h was
obtained and calculated (data not shown) from published
data [18]], which as a whole creates a favorable factor for
rapid settling of any epidemic. It becomes evident that
authorities must keep a state of disease awareness at all
times. Little is known on the routes of infection of SARS
coronavirus [19]. In this study, the effect of HLA alleles on
the resistance or susceptibility to SARS coronavirus
infection was shown to be associated to class I alleles. No
association with class II alleles was seen. Quickly estab-
lishing a procedure of mass screening for health care
workers at risk of exposure to SARS coronavirus by detect-
ing HLA-B* 4601 and possibly HLA-B* 1301 alleles
appears justified. The results of such screening would help
hospitals to better guard their personals against infection,
make the workplace safer, and help to ease the tension
and anxiety seen in the hospital environment.
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